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769 
REORIENTING PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE AROUND 
HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM RATHER THAN LIBERTY AFTER 
WALDEN v. FIORE 
by 
Allan Erbsen* 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressing personal jurisdiction has 
vacillated between different rationales for limiting judicial authority. 
Some decisions emphasize liberty, some invoke federalism, and some rely 
on both. This Article uses the Court’s 2014 decision in Walden v. Fiore 
to show that recent emphasis on gilded rhetoric about liberty blurs the 
distinction between venue and jurisdiction, misconstrues the relevant 
private interests, and fails to consider the allocation of authority among 
coequal states in a federal system.  
Walden held that adjudication of a civil suit in a Nevada federal court 
rather than in a Georgia federal court would infringe the defendant’s 
“liberty.” However, this Article explains that if Congress had authorized 
nationwide service of process, the supposedly abusive assertion of 
personal jurisdiction that the Court unanimously found 
unconstitutional would have been justified. 
Congress’s power to confer personal jurisdiction that would otherwise be 
unconstitutional requires rethinking how the Constitution limits states’ 
adjudicative authority. The prospect of nationwide jurisdiction 
highlights a critical distinction between states as physical places and 
states as government entities. Jurisdiction might be appropriate in a state 
even if a defendant cannot be compelled to appear by the state. This 
in/by distinction reveals that modern personal jurisdiction doctrine 
conflates two distinct questions: (1) where may litigation occur, and (2) 
which governments may authorize litigation. Disentangling the “where” 
and “which governments” questions has several implications. 
First, constitutional limits on venue may operate separately from limits 
on personal jurisdiction. Venue doctrine should assess whether litigation 
in a particular physical location is appropriate while personal 
jurisdiction doctrine should consider whether a particular government 
can compel the defendant to appear. Second, individual liberty is not a 
helpful animating principle for determining which governments should 
be able to authorize jurisdiction. My argument does not rely on formal 
labels, but the word “immunity” may be more helpful than liberty for 
describing the dynamics of personal jurisdiction when defendants are 
domiciled outside the forum. Essentially, defendants have a limited 
 
* Associate Professor and Solly Robins Distinguished Research Fellow, University 
of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Jill Hasday for helpful comments.  
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immunity from suit that the forum can abrogate, depending on the 
defendant’s actions, government interests, and competing private 
interests. In contrast, a “liberty” interest that Congress can override 
merely by deciding to authorize nationwide service seems hollow. Third, 
principles of horizontal federalism—which govern relationships between 
states in a federal system—can help courts allocate jurisdictional power 
among potential fora. Courts might profitably analogize issues that arise 
when considering personal jurisdiction to issues that arise when 
analyzing choice of law, enforcement of judgments, extraterritorial 
legislation, and dormant federal preemption of state authority. 
 
I.  Walden’s Facts and Holding ...................................................... 772 
II.  If Congress Had Authorized Nationwide Service of 
Process, the Defendant in Walden Would Have Been 
Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in Nevada ........................ 774 
III.  Congress’s Power to Authorize Personal Jurisdiction 
Even When the Defendant Lacks Contacts with the 
Forum State Undermines Several Pillars of Modern 
Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine .............................................. 779 
A. Disentangling the Physical and Legal Dimensions of States and 
Distinguishing Constitutional Limits on Venue from 
Constitutional Limits on Jurisdiction .......................................... 780 
B. Decoupling Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine from Concerns About 
Liberty ...................................................................................... 781 
C. Reframing Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in Terms of Horizontal 
Federalism ................................................................................. 787 
IV.  Conclusion .................................................................................. 790 
 
Imagine a simple hypothetical case in which a state court lacks 
personal jurisdiction. A resident of Florida driving through his small 
hometown while intoxicated struck a vacationing Alaska resident, causing 
moderate injuries. The driver had never set foot outside Florida and did 
not anticipate that he would encounter non-Floridians along his route. 
The victim recuperated from her injuries in Florida, returned to Alaska 
at the end of her vacation, and filed a civil action against the driver in an 
Alaska state court. May the Alaska court exercise personal jurisdiction 
under current doctrine? Of course not. Modern personal jurisdiction 
doctrine requires “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the 
forum.1 The driver had no contacts with Alaska and therefore was beyond 
its reach.2 
 
1 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
2 See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). In Rush, a one-car accident in Indiana 
injured two Indiana residents. The passenger then moved to Minnesota, where she 
filed a civil action against the driver. Among several reasons for rejecting personal 
jurisdiction, the Court held that “the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum” were 
irrelevant when the defendant had “no contacts with the forum.” Id. at 332 (emphasis 
in original). 
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Now suppose that the Supreme Court decides to revisit personal 
jurisdiction doctrine from first principles. Instead of relying on 
precedent, our hypothetical Florida resident would need to articulate a 
theory of why he is immune from suit in Alaska. 
Objections to jurisdiction might take three forms. First, the 
defendant has no contacts with the forum, suggesting that he may have a 
liberty interest in resisting the forum’s authority. Second, the forum is far 
from the defendant’s home. Litigation in the distant forum might 
therefore impose undue burdens on the defendant’s liberty. Finally, 
coequal states in a federal system have competing interests in providing a 
forum for civil litigation. Here, conduct, injuries, and convalescence 
occurred in the same state, suggesting that the case belongs in that state 
rather than in the state where the plaintiff resided. The first two 
objections replicate modern doctrine by raising concerns about liberty. 
But the third objection departs from the supposed focus of modern 
doctrine by raising concerns about federalism.3 
If we revisit personal jurisdiction doctrine from first principles, we 
must ask whether the first two objections should be more salient than the 
third. Why should courts conceptualize jurisdictional limits in terms of 
liberty rather than in terms of the allocation of regulatory power within a 
federal system? The defendant’s interests would still matter in a legal 
calculus centered on federalism, but the nature and weight of those 
interests would differ if liberty were not the animating principle. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Walden v. Fiore4 provides an 
opportunity to revisit the role of federalism in personal jurisdiction 
doctrine. In Walden, the Court unanimously held that adjudication of a 
civil suit in a Nevada federal court rather than in a Georgia federal court 
would infringe the defendant’s “liberty” because he lacked a “substantial 
connection with the forum State.”5 
Congress could have avoided the result in Walden by authorizing 
nationwide service of process.6 If Congress had authorized nationwide 
service, the defendant’s contacts with the United States would have 
permitted litigation in Nevada despite his lack of contacts with Nevada. 
The supposedly abusive assertion of personal jurisdiction that a 
unanimous Court found unconstitutional would have been justified. 
The fact that Congress can confer personal jurisdiction that 
otherwise would not survive constitutional scrutiny requires rethinking 
how the Constitution limits states’ adjudicative authority. Congress’s 
power highlights a critical distinction between states as physical places 
and states as government entities. Jurisdiction might be appropriate in a 
state even if a defendant cannot be compelled to appear by the state. This 
 
3 See infra Part III(B). 
4 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
5 Id. at 1121–22, 1125 n.9. 
6 See infra Part II. 
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in/by distinction reveals that modern personal jurisdiction doctrine 
conflates two distinct questions: (1) where may litigation occur, and (2) 
which governments may authorize litigation. Disentangling these 
questions has several implications. First, constitutional limits on venue 
may operate separately from limits on personal jurisdiction. Second, 
individual liberty is not a helpful animating principle for determining 
which governments should be able to authorize jurisdiction. Third, 
principles of horizontal federalism—which govern relationships between 
states in a federal system—can help courts allocate jurisdictional 
authority among potential fora. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses the facts and 
holding in Walden. Part II explains why jurisdiction would have been 
appropriate in Nevada if Congress had authorized nationwide service of 
process. Finally, Part III explores the implications of Congress’s power to 
authorize jurisdiction that would otherwise have been unconstitutional. I 
previously addressed some of these implications in a wider-ranging article 
that predates Walden (as well as the Court’s important decision in J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro7).8 This Article builds on my prior work 
and highlights the continued need to rethink personal jurisdiction 
doctrine as it becomes progressively more unwieldy and undertheorized. 
I. WALDEN’S FACTS AND HOLDING 
According to their complaint,9 plaintiffs Gina Fiore and Keith 
Gipson were professional gamblers who were travelling through an 
airport in Atlanta, Georgia, en route to their residence in Nevada.10 
Defendant Michael Anthony Walden11 was a local Georgia police officer 
working with a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) task force at 
the airport.12 
Various interactions in Atlanta between the plaintiffs and the DEA 
led the DEA to seize approximately $97,000 in cash from the plaintiffs’ 
clothing and baggage.13 Walden then submitted an affidavit of probable 
cause justifying civil forfeiture of the seized currency by connecting the 
money to drug trafficking.14 This affidavit was allegedly false because 
Walden knew that the money was not related to drugs and was instead 
 
7 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
8 See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 Emory L.J. 1 (2010). 
9 The Court assumed that the allegations in the complaint were true. See Walden, 
134 S. Ct. at 1119 n.2. This Article makes the same assumption. 
10 See id. at 1119. 
11 The Court referred to the defendant as “Anthony Walden.” Id. at 1119. But he 
signed his declaration as “Michael Anthony Walden.” Joint Appendix at 43, Walden, 
134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574). 
12 See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
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related to legal gambling.15 The United States Attorney’s Office in 
Georgia eventually instructed the DEA to return the seized currency to 
plaintiffs.16 
The plaintiffs filed a Bivens action17 against Walden in the United 
States District Court for the District of Nevada. They alleged that the false 
affidavit violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment by delaying 
return of their money.18 
Personal jurisdiction in Nevada was tenuous. Walden’s sole relevant 
contacts with the forum were that he knew that the seized currency was 
en route to Nevada, knew that some of it may have originated in Nevada, 
and acted in a way that caused the plaintiffs to suffer emotional and 
economic injuries in Nevada.19 In all other respects, Walden’s contacts 
were with Georgia—where he lived, worked, seized the currency, and 
wrote the affidavit. 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that Walden was not subject 
to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. Although he had contacts with 
residents of Nevada, he did not have contact with “Nevada itself.”20 The 
Court observed that “mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient 
connection to the forum” absent conduct by the defendant that 
“connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”21 Walden’s contacts 
with Nevada were not “meaningful” because even though he “knew” 
about them, he did not “create” them.22 Instead, the plaintiffs “chose” to 
locate themselves in Nevada.23 Thus, the fact that Walden “never traveled 
to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or 
anyone to Nevada” precluded jurisdiction.24 
 
15 See id. at 1120. 
16 See id. 
17 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971). 
18 The complaint arguably did not articulate the claim that animated plaintiffs’ 
appellate theory of personal jurisdiction. See Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 593 n.4 
(9th Cir. 2012) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (“One combs through the complaint in vain to 
find any argument that the creation of a false probable cause affidavit is a separate 
constitutional tort [from the wrongful seizure].”), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
19 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119, 1125–26. Walden also “may have known that 
Plaintiffs lived in Nevada.” Fiore v. Walden, No. 2:07-CV-01674-ECR, 2008 WL 
9833854, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 17, 2008), rev’d, 688 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 
S. Ct. 1115. 
20 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125. For a critique of Walden’s distinction between a state 
and its residents, see Allan Erbsen, Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Local Effects of 
Intentional Misconduct, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 385. 
21 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125. 
22 Id. at 1125–26. 
23 Id. at 1125. 
24 Id. at 1124. 
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II. IF CONGRESS HAD AUTHORIZED NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF 
PROCESS, THE DEFENDANT IN WALDEN WOULD HAVE BEEN 
SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN NEVADA 
Walden relies on precedent about personal jurisdiction that invokes 
lofty ideals of “liberty,” “fair play,” and “substantial justice.”25 This styling 
implies that the holding is a bulwark against extravagant assertions of 
jurisdiction and that the facts of the case were fundamentally 
incompatible with adjudication in Nevada. Yet the exact same facts would 
have warranted jurisdiction in Nevada if Congress had changed the 
applicable service of process rule. 
Jurisdiction was not appropriate in Nevada because Congress has not 
authorized nationwide service of process in Bivens actions.26 Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 4(k) governs “Territorial Limits” for service of process 
in federal court.27 The default under Rule 4(k)(1)(A) is that federal 
courts borrow the long-arm statute of the state in which they sit.28 The 
Supreme Court therefore analyzed personal jurisdiction over Walden as 
if the case were filed in a Nevada state court.29 If Congress had authorized 
nationwide service of process, then Rule 4(k)(1)(C) would have made 
 
25 See id. at 1121–22. 
26 Congress arguably did authorize nationwide service of process in Bivens 
actions, but the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the statute. A venue statute 
governing suits against federal officers allows plaintiffs to sue in their home states and 
serve process “beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is 
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C), (e)(2) (2012). The Supreme Court observed 
that § 1391(e)(2) authorizes “nationwide service of process.” Schlanger v. Seamans, 
401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 (1971). However, the Court held that § 1391(e) does not apply 
to “personal damages actions,” including Bivens actions. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 
527, 545 (1980). For an argument that Stafford misread § 1391(e), see Daniel 
Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts: Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and 
Stafford v. Briggs, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 713 (2015). Interestingly, even if 
§ 1391(e) applied to Bivens actions, it might not have applied to the action against 
Walden. The statute governs suits against an “officer or employee of the United 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). Walden was a local police officer working on a state–
federal task force. The United States acknowledged that he was a “federal agent.” 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Walden, 134 
S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574). Whether he was a federal “officer or employee” under 
§ 1391(e) is unclear, although courts have treated local police officers as federal 
officers under analogous circumstances. See United States v. Luna, 649 F.3d 91, 98 
(1st Cir. 2011) (holding that local law enforcement officer working on a joint 
federal–state task force was an “officer . . . of the United States” under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 111); United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d 1212, 1214–15 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that local police officer deputized by the FBI was an “officer . . . of the United States” 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1114). 
27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k). 
28 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Serving a summons . . . establishes personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of 
general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.”). 
29 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) and the Nevada 
long-arm statute). 
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the Nevada long-arm statute irrelevant.30 The federal district court would 
no longer have needed to confine itself to the jurisdictional reach of 
Nevada’s courts.31 
If a statute had authorized nationwide service, then a different 
constitutional standard would have governed Walden’s objection to 
personal jurisdiction. His contacts with the forum would still have 
mattered, but the definition of the forum would have changed. The 
United States would have been the relevant forum, rather than Nevada.32 
That expanded geographic focus makes all the difference: Walden’s 
limited contacts with Nevada would cease to preclude jurisdiction and his 
contacts with the United States as a whole would justify jurisdiction.33 
The constitutional inquiry for nationwide service cases in federal 
courts is less developed than the parallel inquiry for ordinary cases in 
state courts.34 However, jurisdiction over Walden in Nevada would have 
been appropriate under either of two theories. 
First, the Court has held that a state can exercise general jurisdiction 
over its domiciliaries.35 A similar rule would presumably enable federal 
courts to exercise general jurisdiction over United States domiciliaries 
when Congress authorizes nationwide service.36 The Court has never 
 
30 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (in effect establishing personal jurisdiction 
“when authorized by a federal statute”). 
31 For a more detailed analysis of personal jurisdiction when Congress authorizes 
nationwide service, see Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 
70 Tex. L. Rev. 1589 (1992); Erbsen, supra note 8, at 49–54; Howard M. Erichson, 
Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1117 (1989). 
32 See, e.g., Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that when a statute authorizes nationwide service of process, 
the “relevant forum” for constitutional purposes is “the United States”). 
33 See infra notes 40–42. 
34 Precedent is sparse for two reasons. First, only a few statutes authorize 
nationwide service, creating relatively few opportunities for litigation about personal 
jurisdiction. See Erichson, supra note 31, at 1123 n.30. Second, the constitutional 
standard for personal jurisdiction in nationwide service cases imposes relatively few 
limits on the forum’s authority, such that many defendants (especially if they reside 
in the United States) would not bother challenging jurisdiction. See infra notes 40–42. 
35 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 
(2011) (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.”); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) 
(“Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the 
reach of the state’s jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of 
appropriate substituted service.”). 
36 General jurisdiction in state court is not entirely analogous to general 
jurisdiction in federal court because the United States is much larger than any state, 
rendering federal jurisdiction more burdensome. However, litigation burdens are 
best understood as implicating constitutional limits on venue rather than 
constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction. See infra Part III(A). Another distinction 
between general jurisdiction in federal and state court might be the varying history 
relevant to each. Thus, although personal service in the forum state is usually 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction over a natural person in state court, service outside 
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expressly endorsed (or rejected) this rule, but three Justices concluded 
that “there [are] no restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the United States over its residents.”37 A fourth 
Justice later reached the same conclusion, observing that “[n]o due 
process problem exists” when federal courts exercise personal 
jurisdiction over “residents of the United States.”38 
Second, even if general jurisdiction based on domicile was not 
available, a nationwide service statute would still have authorized 
jurisdiction in Nevada under the minimum contacts test. The Supreme 
Court has explicitly declined to decide whether federal statutes 
authorizing nationwide service permit personal jurisdiction “based on an 
aggregation of the defendant’s contacts with the Nation as a whole, 
rather than on its contacts with the State in which the federal court sits.”39 
However, all the federal appellate courts that have addressed the issue 
agree that when Congress authorizes nationwide service, the Constitution 
requires minimum contacts with the United States rather than with the 
forum state. In six circuits, minimum contacts with the United States are 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction.40 Four circuits add a requirement that 
adjudication in the forum must be fair.41 Two other circuits fall into one 
of these groups, but have not been clear about which.42 
 
the forum state but within the United States might not be sufficient in federal court 
even when Congress authorizes nationwide service. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 
495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion) (linking jurisdiction based on presence 
in the forum to “continuing traditions of our legal system”). 
37 Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 192 (1979) (White, J., 
dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.). 
38 Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Assessing 
Congress’s authority to authorize nationwide service against foreign entities in 
transnational litigation may raise additional issues that are not present when the 
defendant is a United States resident. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 
(2014) (noting importance of “comity” and “international rapport” when analyzing 
general jurisdiction in transnational litigation); cf. Donald Earl Childress III, General 
Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, 66 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 67 (2013), 
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2013/09/Childress_Final.pdf 
(considering how forum shopping in transnational litigation should affect traditional 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence). 
39 Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987). 
40 See Luallen v. Higgs, 277 F. App’x 402, 404–05 (5th Cir. 2008) (confirming 
validity of previously challenged decision in Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien, 
Law Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994)); SEC v. Bilzerian, 378 F.3d 1100, 1106 
n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Med. Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Bd. of Trs. v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Fed. 
Fountain, Inc., 165 F.3d 600, 601–02 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Go-Video Inc. v. Akai 
Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1416–17 (9th Cir. 1989). 
41 See SEC v. Montle, 65 F. App’x 749, 751–52 (2d Cir. 2003); Peay v. BellSouth 
Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000); ESAB Grp., Inc. v. 
Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 627 (4th Cir. 1997); Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings 
(Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 945–48 (11th Cir. 1997). 
42 See Sinclair v. Atty. Gen., 198 F. App’x 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2006) (confirming 
continued uncertainty after Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 370 n.2 (3d 
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Jurisdiction over Walden in Nevada would have been appropriate 
under the minimum contacts standard that applies to nationwide service 
cases in federal courts.43 Walden had ample contacts with the United 
States, where he resided, worked, acted, and caused injury. His lack of 
contacts with Nevada would have been irrelevant. 
Even in the circuits that consider whether personal jurisdiction in 
nationwide service cases would be unfair,44 Walden would have lacked a 
compelling fairness objection. Indeed, Walden’s counsel conceded at 
oral argument that his client would have lacked a constitutional 
objection to personal jurisdiction if Congress had authorized nationwide 
service.45 That concession was appropriate. Walden did not need to locate 
competent local counsel because he was represented in the District Court 
by Department of Justice lawyers based in Nevada.46 He also probably 
would not have had to travel to Nevada. His deposition could have been 
taken in Georgia,47 his physical presence would have been unnecessary 
for routine hearings,48 and the probability of the case going to trial was at 
 
Cir. 2002)); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 
1080, 1085 (1st Cir. 1992). 
43 For an argument that the current standard should be stricter, see Janet Cooper 
Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 
387, 439 (1992) (“Since International Shoe, we have viewed the constitutionality of 
exercises of personal jurisdiction as a question of fundamental fairness that turns on 
an individualized evaluation of the burdens and inconvenience to the defendant in 
light of the relationship of the defendant and the litigation to the forum. These 
concerns do not evaporate if a different flag flies over the courthouse.” (footnote 
omitted)). Interesting constitutional questions about the relevance of contacts with 
the forum state arise when nationwide service is available for state law claims in 
federal court. See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 50 n.203 (discussing potential Erie issues in 
diversity cases when the federal service rules have a longer reach than otherwise 
applicable state service rules); Jackie Gardina, The Bankruptcy of Due Process: Nationwide 
Service of Process, Personal Jurisdiction and the Bankruptcy Code, 16 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. 
Rev. 37 (2008) (discussing adjudication of state law claims in federal bankruptcy 
courts). 
44 See supra notes 41–42. 
45 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574) 
(“[T]he only reason that . . . the personal jurisdiction question, as applied in this 
case, is a constitutional one is because Congress hasn’t provided for nationwide 
service of process for Bivens claims.”). 
46 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574). Walden 
subsequently obtained private counsel after losing in the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 9. 
The record is apparently silent about why he obtained new counsel and whether the 
United States paid all his legal expenses, although the United States paid for his 
representation in the Supreme Court. See Klerman, supra note 26, at 722 n.38. 
47 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(B) (allowing court to grant protective order 
specifying “place” for discovery); Farquhar v. Shelden, 116 F.R.D. 70, 72 (E.D. Mich. 
1987) (noting presumption in favor of deposing non-resident defendants in their 
home states); O’Sullivan v. Rivera, 229 F.R.D. 187, 189 (D.N.M. 2004) (holding that 
even though a Colorado resident “subjected himself to personal jurisdiction in New 
Mexico,” the plaintiff must depose him in Colorado). 
48 Even if Walden participated, he may have been able to appear “telephonically 
or by video conference.” Wilcox v. Career Step, L.L.C., No. 2:08-CV-998 CW, 2010 WL 
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best low,49 if not infinitesimal.50 Indeed, Walden might not have noticed 
any significant difference between litigation in Nevada and Georgia.51 
Upholding personal jurisdiction in Nevada therefore was unlikely to 
impose an undue burden,52 especially in proportion to the correlative 
burden of requiring plaintiffs to litigate in Georgia.53 
 
4968263, at *4 (D. Utah Dec. 1, 2010) (rejecting challenge to personal jurisdiction in 
part because technology facilitated appearances by nonresident defendants); Talent 
Tree, Inc. v. Madlock, No. 4:07-cv-03735, 2008 WL 8082752, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 
2008) (exercising personal jurisdiction and noting that “given modern 
communications, many interactions with the Court, including hearings, can be 
conducted electronically or by telephone”). 
49 Identifying the percentage of Bivens actions that reach trial is difficult because 
of how the Administrative Office of the United States Courts codes data. See 
Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for 
the Individual Liability Model, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 809, 833 & n.131 (2010) (noting that 
several broad case categories encompass Bivens claims). However, the trial rate 
appears to be very low. In 2008—the year that plaintiffs sued Walden—the national 
trial rate for “other civil rights” actions against the United States was 1.4%. Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts, 2008 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial 
Business of the United States Courts 167 tbl.C-4 (2008) (showing data from the 
year ending September 30, 2008). That is similar to the 1.2% trial rate in 2008 for the 
District of Nevada’s entire civil docket. See id. at 173 tbl.C-4A. 
50 Walden was a strong candidate for pretrial settlement given that the United 
States Attorney’s office in Georgia apparently concluded that the challenged 
probable cause affidavit did not justify forfeiture. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119–20; cf. 
Reinert, supra note 49, at 846 & n.167 (noting that the United States generally pays 
settlements negotiated on behalf of Bivens defendants). 
51 Perhaps Walden would have preferred to meet with his lawyers in person 
rather than via telephone or video conferencing. But that concern does not warrant a 
constitutional remedy. See Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 
F.3d 935, 947 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is only in highly unusual cases that 
inconvenience will rise to a level of constitutional concern [in nationwide service 
cases].”); Klein v. Eaton, No. 2:13-cv-00440, 2014 WL 1922723, at *3 (D. Utah May 14, 
2014) (upholding personal jurisdiction over nonresident and observing that “[a]ny 
burden of litigating this matter in Utah is significantly lessened by technology that 
allows [the defendant] to communicate remotely with counsel and to travel between 
Texas and Utah”). 
52 See Arocho v. Nafziger, 367 F. App’x 942, 951 (10th Cir. 2010) (upholding 
personal jurisdiction in Colorado Bivens action against federal officer in Washington, 
D.C., who “can count on the resources and legal staff of the United States Attorney 
for Colorado to defend his interests”). But see Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 
(2006) (noting that qualified immunity in Bivens actions protects officers from the 
“burden of trial”); Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 545 (1980) (expressing concern 
about “the burden of defending personal damages actions” under Bivens). 
53 Unlike Walden, plaintiffs lacked the benefit of representation by the 
Department of Justice. The plaintiffs also contended that requiring them to travel 
could create disturbing incentives for potential defendants. They speculated that law 
enforcement officers may feel “embolden[ed]” to seize property from travelers 
because the agents know that owners would encounter difficulty returning to the situs 
of the seizure to oppose forfeiture. Brief for the Respondents at 48, Walden, 134 S. Ct. 
1115 (No. 12-574) (noting that when local officers such as Walden seize currency, 
some of the revenue might be used to fund their local police departments). 
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In the unlikely event that litigating in Nevada would have been 
burdensome, statutory remedies were available to protect Walden. First, 
he could have challenged venue.54 Walden actually did challenge venue 
in Nevada, but dismissal on personal jurisdiction grounds mooted his 
venue arguments.55 A successful venue challenge would have resolved 
Walden’s fairness concerns.56 Second, if the federal court in Nevada had 
doubts about whether venue was reasonable, it could have transferred 
the case to a federal court in Georgia.57 Transfer would have resolved 
fairness concerns without resort to constitutional law.58 
In sum, Congress could have forced Walden to litigate in Nevada 
despite his lack of contacts with Nevada. If Congress had authorized 
nationwide service, the constitutional objections endorsed in Walden 
would have been irrelevant. 
III. CONGRESS’S POWER TO AUTHORIZE PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION EVEN WHEN THE DEFENDANT LACKS CONTACTS 
WITH THE FORUM STATE UNDERMINES SEVERAL PILLARS OF 
MODERN PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE 
The foregoing discussion may seem academic because Congress did 
not authorize nationwide service in Bivens actions. The Supreme Court’s 
focus on Walden’s contacts with Nevada was therefore appropriate under 
current doctrine. Moreover, I am not contending that nationwide service 
 
54 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2012) (listing venue requirements). 
55 See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 n.5. The Ninth Circuit had upheld venue in 
Nevada. See Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 587–88 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 
1115 (2014). Justice Scalia apparently contemplated ruling for Walden on venue 
grounds without considering personal jurisdiction. See Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 5, Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (No. 12-574) (“Of course, the venue question . . . does 
not bring into the Court a constitutional question and the . . . the jurisdictional one 
does. . . . And we usually try to avoid constitutional questions.”). 
56 Courts may address challenges to venue before addressing challenges to 
personal jurisdiction. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 
422, 432 (2007). 
57 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, 
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other 
district or division where it might have been brought . . . .”). Venue would have been 
proper in the Northern District of Georgia because a “substantial part of the events or 
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in Atlanta. Id. § 1391(b)(2). 
58 See, e.g., Mountain Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Heimerl & Lammers, LLC, 9 F. Supp. 3d 
895, 898 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (transferring case to a “more convenient forum” and 
thereby mooting a pending challenge to personal jurisdiction). The district court in 
Walden asked the parties if they wished to request a transfer, but they apparently 
declined. See Fiore v. Walden, No. 2:07-CV-01674-ECR, 2008 WL 9833854, at *4 (D. 
Nev. Oct. 17, 2008) (“[T]he parties here agree that such a transfer would not be in 
the interests of justice.”), rev’d, 688 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1115 
(2014). The district court focused on transferring the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 
due to a lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. It is not clear whether the district court 
also considered transferring the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) before addressing 
personal jurisdiction. 
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is desirable in Bivens actions or in general.59 Instead, my argument 
focuses on how Congress’s ability to authorize personal jurisdiction 
requires reconsidering doctrine that applies when Congress has not 
acted. 
The fact that Congress could have altered the result in Walden 
suggests that the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is 
fundamentally misguided. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, 
the question of whether venue within the state’s borders would be 
burdensome is analytically distinct from the question of which 
governments can compel a defendant to appear within those borders. 
Second, the concept of “liberty” is not helpful when trying to determine 
which governments can compel a defendant’s appearance. Finally, when 
Congress has not authorized nationwide service, personal jurisdiction 
should be understood as a horizontal federalism problem.60 
A. Disentangling the Physical and Legal Dimensions of States and 
Distinguishing Constitutional Limits on Venue from Constitutional Limits on 
Jurisdiction 
“States” exist in two distinct forms: as physical places and as 
government entities.61 When assessing constitutional limits on personal 
jurisdiction, courts must consider two different issues: whether litigation 
is appropriate within the state’s physical borders; and whether the state 
may compel the defendant to appear and penalize him for not 
appearing. Distinguishing these issues isolates two key questions: (1) 
where is litigation appropriate; and (2) which governments may exercise 
jurisdiction? 
Asking the “where” question in Walden reveals that adjudication in 
Nevada did not raise constitutional concerns relevant to personal 
jurisdiction. Litigation in Nevada would have been equally burdensome 
whether Congress authorized nationwide service or borrowed Nevada’s 
long-arm statute. Likewise, the plaintiffs’ interest in litigating in Nevada 
would have been equally strong, as would the relevant government’s 
interest in providing a forum in Nevada.62 Accordingly, if the defendant’s 
 
59 I have previously observed that nationwide service might not be optimal in 
many diversity cases; whether it is appropriate in particular federal question cases is 
beyond the scope of this Article. See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 83 n.323. For recent 
proposals to expand nationwide service in federal court, see Klerman, supra note 26; 
Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1301 
(2014); A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87 
Denv. U. L. Rev. 325 (2010). 
60 A more detailed account of the underlying theory is available in my prior work. 
See Erbsen, supra note 8. 
61 For analysis of how geography and government power intersect in the federal 
system, see Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1168 (2011). 
62 Nevada’s long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction to the maximum extent that 
the Constitution allows. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 14.065(1) (2013). Thus, whether 
Congress authorized nationwide service or borrowed Nevada’s long-arm statute, the 
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interest in avoiding the burdens of litigation in Nevada could not have 
raised a constitutional obstacle to personal jurisdiction in a nationwide 
service case, it could not have raised a constitutional obstacle in either 
the actual Walden case or an identical hypothetical case filed in a Nevada 
state court under the same long-arm statute.63 
The apparent absence of a remedy for burdensome assertions of 
forum power may seem troubling, but there is an easy solution: the Court 
should constitutionalize venue doctrine, such that neither Congress nor 
the states may authorize unduly burdensome litigation.64 The 
Constitution would generate two distinct doctrines addressing two 
distinct inquiries: venue doctrine would assess whether litigation in a 
particular physical location is appropriate while personal jurisdiction 
doctrine would consider whether a particular government can compel 
the defendant to appear. 
Given that the constitutional concern animating Walden could not 
have arisen from the “where” question, it must have arisen from the 
“which governments” question. In other words, the problem was that the 
defendant was haled into court under the authority of a government that 
could not compel his appearance. In Walden, the relevant government 
entity was Nevada because Congress chose to make federal authority 
coextensive with Nevada’s authority.65 If Congress had authorized 
nationwide service, the relevant government would have been the United 
States and jurisdiction would have been proper.66 The next two sections 
consider how courts should approach the “which governments” question. 
B. Decoupling Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine from Concerns About Liberty 
If jurisdiction hinges on the identity of the government actor 
asserting power, then liberty should not be the central issue. Outside the 
personal jurisdiction context, the Court often invokes individual liberty 
 
relevant government would have been attempting to extend its reach as far as 
possible. 
63 The Court often interchangeably cites precedents involving personal 
jurisdiction in state and federal court when the federal court relied on the state’s 
long-arm statute. For example, Walden was a case about jurisdiction in federal court, 
but it extensively cited an analogous precedent about jurisdiction in state court 
without noting the federal/state distinction. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–24 
(discussing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). 
64 See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 18–32 (discussing constitutional limits on venue); 
Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash, Constitutional Venue, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 1153 
(2014). 
65 See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 51–52 & n.212 (considering how “due process” 
applies in federal court when federal law incorporates limits on state authority). A 
constitutional rule might limit even intrastate venue, preventing large states from 
compelling a defendant to appear in a distant outlying area. See id. at 29–31 (“The 
current rule making burdens relevant when the issue is ‘jurisdiction’ but not when 
the issue is ‘venue’ is a pointless jurisprudence of labels.”). 
66 See supra Part II. 
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in the sense of a protected zone of conduct, where the emphasis is on 
shielding the actor from government interference with his or her 
behavior.67 This aspect of liberty would be relevant to personal 
jurisdiction if the fear of jurisdictional consequences chilled 
constitutionally protected activity. Yet the Court has declined an 
opportunity to consider this aspect of liberty in a personal jurisdiction 
case.68 Liberty may also be relevant in the sense that it protects people 
from being wrongfully seized by the government, which is what service of 
process symbolically achieves.69 Yet that conception of liberty could not 
have animated Walden because the liberty interest in avoiding a civil 
summons does not create a right to avoid being sued anywhere, but merely 
a right to avoid being sued in the wrong forum. Nobody argued in Walden 
that the defendant could not be served with process. The only issue was 
whether process needed to emanate from Georgia rather than Nevada. 
My argument does not rely on formal labels, but the word 
“immunity” may be more helpful than liberty for describing the dynamics 
of personal jurisdiction when defendants are domiciled outside the 
forum.70 Essentially, defendants have a limited immunity from suit that 
the forum can abrogate,71 depending on the defendant’s actions, 
 
67 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have not generated a single 
comprehensive account of individual liberty interests because “the Court has not 
assumed to define ‘liberty’ with any great precision.” Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 
499 (1954). I therefore do not doubt that framing personal jurisdiction in terms of 
liberty might be theoretically coherent for some purposes, but instead contend that 
references to liberty in personal jurisdiction cases are often unhelpful. 
68 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (“We also reject the suggestion 
that First Amendment concerns enter into the jurisdictional analysis. The infusion of 
such considerations would needlessly complicate an already imprecise inquiry.”). 
69 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“Historically the 
jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto 
power over the defendant’s person.”); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709, 712 
(N.Y. 1965) (“[Personal jurisdiction] is an imposition of sovereign power over the 
person. It is usually exerted by symbolic and rarely by actual force, e.g., the summons 
as a symbol of force; the attachment and the civil arrest, as exerting actual force.”); 
Nathan Levy, Jr., Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine, 
78 Yale L.J. 52, 58–80 (1968) (tracing history of service mechanisms that were to 
varying degrees symbolic and coercive). 
70 Defendants domiciled within the forum are subject to general jurisdiction and 
thus have no immunity from suit. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (“For an 
individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the 
individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the 
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”). 
71 Cf. Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 
Harv. L. Rev. 1559 (2002) (exploring doctrine that blurs concepts of immunity and 
personal jurisdiction). I do not intend this informal word choice to imply that 
personal jurisdiction doctrine is rooted in an “Immunities” Clause of the 
Constitution. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to 
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 
(“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
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government interests, and competing private interests.72 In contrast, a 
“liberty” interest that Congress can override merely by deciding to 
authorize nationwide service seems hollow. This hollowness is the core of 
modern doctrine. 
For example, Justice Kennedy recently explained in J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro that personal jurisdiction offends “liberty” when 
the forum does not exercise “lawful” power.73 Whether power is lawful in 
this framework depends on who exercises it: “a judicial judgment is 
lawful” if “the sovereign has authority to render it,” which requires 
analysis “sovereign-by-sovereign.”74 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s plurality 
opinion acknowledged that a federal court might be able to exercise 
personal jurisdiction when a colocated state court could not,75 and that 
allowing the wrong state to exercise jurisdiction “would upset the federal 
balance, which posits that each State has a sovereignty that is not subject 
to unlawful intrusion by other States.”76 Despite these concessions, the 
Nicastro plurality embraced the Court’s prior decision in Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,77 denying that federalism 
concerns animate personal jurisdiction doctrine.78 The plurality therefore 
intermingled its references to federalism with a rights-centered vision of 
liberty, stating that “it is the defendant’s purposeful availment that makes 
jurisdiction consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
 
immunities of citizens of the United States.”); see also Erbsen, supra note 8, at 86 n.331 
(discussing Article IV). 
72 For a discussion of interest balancing in a portion of the Court’s Asahi opinion 
that garnered eight votes, see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 
114 (1987) (“When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of 
the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious 
burdens placed on the alien defendant.”). 
73 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
mustered three additional votes (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas). A separate concurrence by Justice Breyer (joined by Justice Alito) 
sidestepped most of the plurality’s constitutional analysis in favor of a narrow 
holding. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“There may well have 
been other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have demonstrated in support of 
jurisdiction. . . . But the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction, and 
here I would take the facts precisely as the New Jersey Supreme Court stated them.”). 
74 Id. at 2789 (plurality opinion). 
75 See id. (“[A] defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States but not of any particular State.”). 
76 Id. For an analysis of Nicastro that situates the plurality opinion in the context 
of Justice Kennedy’s broader jurisprudence about sovereignty, see John T. Parry, 
Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. 
McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 827, 860–63 (2012). 
77 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
78 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (“Personal jurisdiction, of 
course, restricts ‘judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of 
individual liberty’ . . . .” (quoting Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702)). 
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justice.”79 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Nicastro also clung to Bauxites,80 
even though a federalism theory might have strengthened the dissent’s 
argument.81 The Justices’ decision to invoke liberty cloaks a federalism 
problem with the distracting rhetoric of individual rights.82 
A high-minded emphasis on liberty can cause courts to lose sight of 
reality. The Nicastro plurality ended its opinion by observing that “the 
Constitution commands restraint before discarding liberty in the name of 
expediency.”83 That gilded rhetoric seems comforting until one focuses 
on the supposed “expediency”: a New Jersey court exercising jurisdiction 
over the manufacturer of a machine that severed four of the plaintiff’s 
fingers in New Jersey.84 The manufacturer had helped market its scrap 
metal shearing machine to buyers throughout the United States,85 and 
 
79 Id. at 2787 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice 
Kennedy suggested in an analogous case that he is more willing to accept the 
existence of state power over a nonresident when local contacts implicate important 
state interests. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“There is a powerful case to be made that a retailer doing extensive 
business within a State” should be subject to taxation by that state “even if that 
business is done through mail or the Internet.”). 
80 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“[C]onstitutional 
limits on a state court’s adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due 
process, not state sovereignty.” (citing Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 703)). 
81 See infra text accompanying notes 84–87. The plurality and dissenting opinions 
may not mean exactly what they appear to say. Each opinion offers an explicit 
account of what it is trying to accomplish, but the tone and emphasis suggest 
additional commitments. Thus, as Wendy Collins Perdue observed: “In the topsy-turvy 
world of personal jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy can assert that he is mostly concerned 
about sovereignty but adopt an approach to jurisdiction that seems far more 
grounded in a particular vision of individual liberty. In contrast, Justice Ginsburg can 
profess that her primary concern is to protect due process rights of individuals, but in 
fact focus on what powers it is reasonable for a state to have to address injuries 
occurring within its borders.” Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with 
It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 729, 743 
(2012). I focus on the methodological approach that the Justices claimed to adopt, 
which most lower courts presumably will attempt to apply. 
82 For additional analysis of Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, see Allan Ides, Foreword: 
A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 45 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 341, 358–70 (2012); Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the 
Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. 
Rev. 481, 491–504 (2012); Allan Erbsen, Personal Jurisdiction, McIntyre v. Nicastro, and 
Horizontal Federalism, PrawfsBlawg (Aug. 17, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2011/08/personal-jurisdiction-mcintyre-v-nicastro-and-horizontal-
federalism.html. Most academic commentary about Nicastro has been critical to 
varying degrees. But see David L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 Stan. J. Complex 
Litig. 41, 78 (2014) (contending that Nicastro’s holding is a “powerful, if indirect” 
means of limiting state authority to regulate product design in a national market). 
83 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (plurality opinion). 
84 See id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
85 See id. at 2795–96. 
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New Jersey was one of its largest potential markets.86 From a federalism 
perspective, it is difficult to see the problem with allowing New Jersey’s 
courts to adjudicate the suit.87 
The Court’s unanimous opinion in Walden does not repeat the 
statements about liberty that appeared in the Nicastro plurality opinion 
three years earlier. Indeed, Walden does not cite Nicastro even though 
Walden’s author (Justice Thomas) was part of the Nicastro plurality. 
Walden simply invoked “liberty” without explaining why it mattered given 
that Congress could easily have authorized jurisdiction notwithstanding 
the asserted liberty interest.88 The lean references to “liberty” in Walden 
compared to the extensive discussion in Nicastro suggests that the Walden 
Court consciously avoided elaboration, perhaps due to the absence of a 
fifth vote for Justice Kennedy’s theories. In any event, Walden indicates 
that the Court has no discernable theory of liberty in personal 
jurisdiction cases. 
Walden relies on liberty without acknowledging that the precedent 
on which it grounds that reliance did not invoke liberty. Walden’s two 
references to “liberty” both cite World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.89 
But the word “liberty” does not appear anywhere in Volkswagen. Instead, 
the cited pages of Volkswagen stated that: 
The concept of minimum contacts . . . can be seen to perform two 
related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant 
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. 
And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not 
 
86 See id. at 2801 (“How could [the defendant] not have intended, by its actions 
targeting a national market, to sell products in the fourth largest destination for 
imports among all States of the United States and the largest scrap metal market?”); 
John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s 
Decisions in Goodyear Dunlap Tires and Nicastro, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1707, 1732 
(2013) (criticizing the plurality’s distinction between serving the entire United States 
market and targeting its individual state components). 
87 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“New Jersey’s exercise 
of personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer whose dangerous product 
caused a workplace injury in New Jersey does not tread on the domain, or diminish 
the sovereignty, of any sister State. Indeed, among States of the United States, the 
State in which the injury occurred would seem most suitable for litigation of a 
products liability tort claim.”). The defendant was a foreign rather than domestic 
corporation, which in some circumstances can complicate analysis of jurisdiction. See 
Erbsen, supra note 8, at 35–36. However, the plurality did not indicate that the 
holding might have changed if the defendant had been based in the United States 
(but outside New Jersey). 
88 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (“Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative 
authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant . . . .” (citing 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980))); id. at 1125 
n.9 (“[W]e reiterate that the ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry principally protects the 
liberty of the nonresident defendant . . . .” (quoting Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291–92)). 
89 444 U.S. 286 (1980). See supra note 88. 
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reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as 
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.90 
Volkswagen’s reference to burdens relates to the “where” question 
discussed above, while the reference to “coequal sovereigns” relates to 
the “which governments” question. Neither reference supports Walden’s 
broad concept of “liberty.” 
The erratic treatment of liberty and federalism in the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction decisions is disconcerting. Here is the relatively 
recent sequence: 
-In Volkswagen, the Court invoked federalism and never 
mentioned liberty. 
-In Bauxites, the Court relied on liberty and retreated from the 
federalism reference in Volkswagen.91 
-In Nicastro, the plurality endorsed Bauxites’ reference to liberty 
while also reviving the federalism angle of Volkswagen. 
-In Walden, the Court relied on liberty rather than federalism 
but attributed the liberty rationale to Volkswagen. 
The Court either does not realize or refuses to acknowledge the 
extent of its vacillations; either way, the consequences are troubling.92 
The problem is that the Court is trying to squeeze a “which governments” 
federalism question into the framework of individual rights, where it does 
not fit comfortably and creates confusion.93 
Reorienting personal jurisdiction doctrine to emphasize horizontal 
federalism would not eliminate consideration of the defendant’s 
interests. First, a newly constitutionalized venue doctrine would account 
for individual rights.94 Second, horizontal federalism doctrines consider 
 
90 Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291–92. 
91 Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
(1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual 
liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of 
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”). The Court in Bauxites retreated 
from Volkswagen’s reference to federalism. See id. at 702 n.10 (“The restriction on state 
sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as 
ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process 
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and 
the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.”). 
92 These vacillations extend farther back than Volkswagen. See Perdue, supra note 
81, at 734–39 (discussing evolution of the Court’s references to liberty, sovereignty, 
and federalism). 
93 For a more theoretical analysis of why liberty is an inadequate guiding 
principle for personal jurisdiction doctrine, see Erbsen, supra note 8, at 54–60; id. at 
66 (“To say that a given exercise of personal jurisdiction is unconstitutional is . . . to 
say that a state has usurped authority that belongs elsewhere. And to say that this 
usurpation offends a ‘right’ or infringes upon ‘liberty’ or violates ‘due process’ simply 
begs the question of what values animate the constitutional inquiry into where 
jurisdiction belongs.”). 
94 See supra Part III(A). 
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individual interests as a part of a broader calculus of competing public 
and private interests.95 Emphasizing federalism places the state at the 
“center” of the inquiry, but still requires developing an “analytic 
approach” that accounts for all relevant factors, including individual 
interests.96 My suggested framework for reforming personal jurisdiction 
doctrine therefore avoids the concern that federalism-oriented theories 
may be unattractive because they “neglect[] to provide any account of 
the individual interests at stake.”97 The challenge for courts is to identify 
individual interests that matter in the context of allocating regulatory 
power in a federal system, rather than interests that resonate with a 
vaguely defined sense of liberty.98 
C. Reframing Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in Terms of Horizontal Federalism 
Sections A and B established that constitutional challenges to 
personal jurisdiction raise questions about the allocation of jurisdictional 
authority in a federal system. This Section briefly notes three potential 
benefits of reframing personal jurisdiction as a horizontal federalism 
problem. 
First, a horizontal federalism perspective facilitates grounding 
personal jurisdiction doctrine in the Constitution’s text. Part of the 
reason that modern personal jurisdiction doctrine is so unstable is that it 
draws authority “only” from the Due Process Clause.99 Yet that clause 
provides very little guidance. For example, the district court in Walden 
provided the defendant adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, an 
impartial adjudicator, and a statutory safety valve that would have allowed 
transfer to a more convenient forum.100 The Due Process Clause does not 
explicitly suggest that more is required, but Walden demanded more.101 
 
95 See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 493, 547–50, 564–66 
(2008). 
96 Perdue, supra note 81, at 739. 
97 Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction: 
Issues Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. 
Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 617, 624 (2012).  
98 See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 748 (1987) (considering implications of 
reframing a rights-oriented theory of “purposeful availment” as a federalism-oriented 
theory of “predictability”). 
99 Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 
(1982) (stating that the Due Process Clause “is the only source of the personal 
jurisdiction requirement”). 
100 See supra note 57–58. 
101 Cf. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462–63 (1940) (upholding personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant domiciled in the forum and observing that “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice implicit in due process” require “notice” 
and “an opportunity to be heard” (citation omitted)). For an argument defending 
the prominent role of “due process” in personal jurisdiction doctrine, see Charles W. 
“Rocky” Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 Tul. L. 
Rev. 567 (2007).  
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Operating without textual guidance, the Court has constructed an array 
of oft-criticized standards, such as “purposeful availment,” “reasonably 
anticipate,” and “minimum contacts.”102 In contrast, numerous provisions 
of the Constitution govern horizontal federalism.103 These texts may not 
be a model of clarity, but collectively can provide additional guidance 
about the allocation of jurisdiction among states with overlapping 
authority. Rebuilding personal jurisdiction doctrine on the foundation of 
these additional texts would provide an opportunity to sweep aside the 
oft-criticized atextual jargon that currently animates judicial decisions. 
Second, building from the prior point, if multiple texts can provide 
more precise guidance, so too can the many doctrines emerging from 
those texts. Courts might profitably analogize personal jurisdiction issues 
to choice of law, enforcement of judgments, extraterritorial legislation, 
and dormant federal preemption of state authority.104 Such an approach 
could have changed the outcome in Nicastro given New Jersey’s strong 
regulatory interests, but might have reached the same result in Walden 
given Nevada’s tenuous connection to the underlying conduct relative to 
Georgia.105 
Finally, treating personal jurisdiction as a federalism problem 
suggests that federal statutory remedies may obviate judicially created 
remedies that rely on the Fourteenth Amendment (although 
constitutional remedies for improper venue would still be available). The 
premise of modern personal jurisdiction doctrine is that adjudication can 
violate individual liberty interests, requiring a judicial remedy (dismissal) 
 
102 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1985)(citations 
omitted). 
103 See Erbsen, supra note 95, at 529–60 (categorizing the Constitution’s methods 
for regulating horizontal federalism). 
104 See id. at 560–72 (identifying patterns in the Court’s jurisprudence governing 
horizontal federalism); Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of 
Horizontal Federalism, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 57, 78 (2014) (noting that personal 
jurisdiction doctrine implicates “horizontal federalism” when it leads to the 
“underenforcement” of state law); Geoffrey P. Miller, In Search of the Most Adequate 
Forum: State Court Personal Jurisdiction, 2 Stan. J. Complex Litig. 1, 24 (2014) 
(suggesting that incorporating “horizontal federalism” principles into personal 
jurisdiction analysis can help identify “the tribunal that can resolve the controversy at 
the lowest social cost”); Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 
Iowa L. Rev. 1163, 1206 (2013) (“[F]ocus[ing] on choice of law explains the 
importance of state lines [in personal jurisdiction doctrine].”). 
105 See supra text accompanying notes 84–86. Eighteen states and the District of 
Columbia filed an amicus brief in Walden contending that their “interest in 
vindicating the injuries of their own residents, as plaintiffs, in their own courts” was 
“outweighed by their interest in protecting their residents from being haled, unfairly, 
into other States’ courts as defendants.” Brief of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at 1, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (No. 12-574); see 
also id. at 2 (“It would be very easy for a State to maintain, in a particular case in 
which one of its residents has been harmed, that it wants its own courts to resolve 
these kinds of disputes. But . . . their residents are better off if personal jurisdiction is 
not based solely on the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s home State.”). 
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that forces the plaintiff to refile in another forum or abandon the suit. 
But if the real problem is not where adjudication occurs but rather which 
government compels the defendant’s appearance, then Congress can 
provide a remedy by authorizing nationwide service and removal to 
federal court. Even if removal and/or nationwide service are not 
available in a particular case, the fact that Congress could have provided 
a statutory remedy but chose not to may be sufficient to preclude 
judicially created remedies that rely on the Fourteenth Amendment 
(although constitutional remedies for improper venue would still be 
available. If considering the “which governments” aspect of personal 
jurisdiction leads to an emphasis on statutory remedies rather than the 
judicially created “minimum contacts” test, then the entire body of 
precedent underlying Walden would become defunct. This theory of 
course has limits, which I have addressed in prior work.106 
Jettisoning decades of precedent would be unsettling, but may be 
faithful to the original Constitution’s design. The constitutional provision 
creating current judicial remedies for aggrieved state court defendants is 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.107 This clause did not 
exist when the Constitution was adopted. In contrast, the Constitution 
has always authorized Congress to federalize certain cases that would 
otherwise have been heard in state courts,108 including cases where local 
residents sue outsiders.109 Common law rules were also available to 
prevent enforcement of judgments rendered without jurisdiction under 
the territorial view of state power in vogue at the time.110 If this regime 
was sufficient to protect outsiders from overreaching states until 1868, it 
may remain sufficient, although more historical research and normative 
analysis would be necessary before reaching a definitive conclusion.111 In 
any event, my argument here does not depend on abandoning judicially 
 
106 See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 35–36, 79. A role for constitutional remedies might 
remain in transnational cases and unusual situations where statutory remedies would 
be inadequate. See id. 
107 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
108 See id. art. III, § 2. 
109 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (“Article III 
poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on 
diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.”). 
110 Compare Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 367 (1873) (opinion by Justice 
Field articulating a territorial theory of jurisdiction without reference to the 
Fourteenth Amendment), with Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (opinion by 
Justice Field that essentially repeats Galpin’s analysis while resting the holding on the 
Due Process Clause); see also John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 1015, 1020–24 (1983) (discussing jurisprudence before 
1868); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: 
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 Va. L. Rev. 169 (2004) (same). 
111 See Erbsen, supra note 8, at 75–88 (discussing the relevant history in more 
detail and suggesting a need for further scholarship about how the original 
Constitution’s mechanisms for addressing personal jurisdiction should influence 
modern doctrine grounded on the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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created remedies that invoke the Constitution. For present purposes, the 
possibility that statutory and common law remedies might be adequate 
requires a more precise account of why judicially enforceable 
constitutional remedies are necessary. Current doctrine blurring venue 
and jurisdiction into a single “liberty” inquiry does not provide a 
sufficient justification for judicial intervention when venue is proper and 
only jurisdiction is at issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The unanimous opinion in Walden is an imposing edifice 
constructed on sand. The result and reasoning seem sturdy until one asks 
unsettling questions. Considering how a nationwide service statute would 
have changed the result reveals that the jurisdictional defect hinged on 
congressional inaction rather than an intrinsic constitutional obstacle to 
litigation in Nevada. Taking that observation to its logical conclusion 
suggests that the Court must overhaul personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
Analysis of venue and personal jurisdiction should entail distinct 
constitutional inquiries, and the inquiry into personal jurisdiction should 
focus on state regulatory authority in a federal system rather than 
individual liberty. There is even a plausible argument that judicially 
created remedies are unnecessary when federal statutory remedies are 
potentially available. 
